Copyright Ownership—Even Iron Man Couldn’t Protect the Work for Hire Doctrine from Third-Party Infringers by Vinson, Elizabeth
SMU Law Review
Volume 70 | Issue 1 Article 9
2017
Copyright Ownership—Even Iron Man Couldn’t
Protect the Work for Hire Doctrine from Third-
Party Infringers
Elizabeth Vinson
Southern Methodist University, evinson@mail.smu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review
by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Elizabeth Vinson, Copyright Ownership—Even Iron Man Couldn’t Protect the Work for Hire Doctrine from Third-Party Infringers, 70 SMU
L. Rev. 221 (2017)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol70/iss1/9
COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP—
EVEN IRON MAN COULDN’T PROTECT
THE WORK FOR HIRE DOCTRINE
FROM THIRD-PARTY INFRINGERS
Elizabeth Vinson*
WHILE copyright ownership “vests initially in the author or au-thors of the work,” the Copyright Act carved out an exceptionfor “works made for hire.”1 The Copyright Act of 1909 created
an “almost irrebuttable presumption that any person who paid another to
create a copyrightable work was the statutory ‘author’ under the ‘work
for hire’ doctrine.”2 Appellate courts have been divided over whether
third parties, meaning a party that is not a potential owner of the copy-
right, should be allowed to raise the work for hire doctrine as a defense to
copyright infringement.3 In the Second Circuit’s most recent struggle with
this issue, Urbont v. Sony Music Entertainment, the majority concluded
that a third party could assert the work for hire provision as a defense to
copyright infringement claims.4 However, this Note argues that the Sec-
ond Circuit’s analysis was flawed because infringing third parties should
not be able to escape liability through the work for hire doctrine.
Jack Urbont, a composer and producer, wrote theme songs for various
Marvel Super Heroes television series.5 In 1966, he wrote the theme song
for Iron Man and presented it to Marvel.6 Although there was no written
agreement between Urbont and Marvel regarding the copyright of the
song, a 1966 certificate of copyright registration by the U.S. Copyright
Office named Urbont as the owner of the work.7 Additionally, “Urbont
filed a renewal notice for the copyright in 1994” and “licensed the Iron
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2018; B.A. Vanderbilt University,
2011.
1. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a)-(b) (2012).
2. Easter Seal Soc’y for Crippled Children and Adults of La., Inc. v. Playboy Enters.,
815 F.2d 323, 327 (5th Cir. 1987).
3. See Urbont v. Sony Music Entm’t, 831 F.3d 80, 86 (2d Cir. 2016); Jules Jordan
Video, Inc. v. 144942 Canada, Inc., 617 F.3d 1146, 1157 (9th Cir. 2010); M.G.B. Homes, Inc.
v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1490 (11th Cir. 1990).
4. Urbont, 831 F.3d at 83.
5. Id. at 83.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 84.
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Man composition for use in the 2008 [Iron Man] movie.”8 In 1995,
Urbont brought suit against Marvel for unauthorized use of the composi-
tion.9 As part of the settlement from that suit, he “agreed to release his
claims and to license the works to Marvel.”10 The settlement referred to
Urbont as “renewal copyright owner of the . . . Superhero Intros . . . and
the Master Recordings thereof,” referred to Marvel as “Licensee,” and
stated that Marvel does not risk “any liability to [o]wner.”11
In 2000, Dennis Coles (the hip hop artist known as Ghostface Killah),
Sony, and Razor Sharp Records released an album named Supreme Cli-
entele that included the Iron Man composition on two songs.12 They did
not have permission from Urbont to use the Iron Man song, and Urbont
was only made aware of the album years later.13 On June 30, 2011,
Urbont filed a copyright infringement suit against Coles, Sony, and Razor
Sharp Records—both sides moved for summary judgment.14 The district
court concluded that Sony had standing to challenge Urbont’s ownership
under the work for hire doctrine.15 According to the court, the Iron Man
theme song was a work for hire because it was composed at Marvel’s
“instance and expense,” and Urbont had not presented sufficient evi-
dence of an ownership agreement with Marvel to dispute that the song
was a work for hire.16 Additionally, the district court rejected Urbont’s
argument that the 1995 settlement was “probative of the parties’ intent at
the time the composition was written.”17 Following this lower court judg-
ment, Urbont appealed the ruling to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals.18
Prior to this opinion, the Second Circuit had not explicitly decided
“whether a third party to an alleged employer-employee relationship has
standing to raise a ‘work for hire’ defense to copyright infringement.”19
While some courts have implicitly allowed the defense, very few decisions
address this issue extensively or recognize the dangerous consequences of
this allowance.20 Among the few courts that have explicitly discussed the
issue, there is an undeniable circuit split.21 In 1990, the Eleventh Circuit












19. Id. at 86.
20. Psihoyos v. Pearson Educ., Inc., 855 F. Supp. 2d 103, 117 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(“Courts have not dealt with this issue extensively . . . .”).
21. See, e.g., M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1490 (11th
Cir. 1990); Jules Jordan Video, Inc. v. 144942 Canada, Inc., 617 F.3d 1146, 1157 (9th Cir.
2010).
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work-for-hire] defense.”22 In a more recent case, the Ninth Circuit re-
jected the use of the work for hire defense by a third party, specifically
where both potential owners of the copyright are parties to the lawsuit
and there is no issue of ownership between them.23 In Urbont, the Second
Circuit followed the Eleventh Circuit’s lead and concluded that “third
parties to an alleged employer-employee relationship have standing to
raise a ‘work for hire’ defense against a claim of copyright
infringement.”24
The Second Circuit began its opinion by disputing Urbont’s reliance on
Jules Jordan, the Ninth Circuit case that rejected third party use of the
work for hire defense.25 The court argued the facts of Jules Jordan were
distinguishable from the facts of the case at hand.26 Most significant to
the Second Circuit was the fact that Marvel, one of the potential owners
of the copyright, was not a party to the lawsuit.27 The court argued Mar-
vel’s absence in the lawsuit made it uncertain whether Marvel would dis-
pute Urbont’s copyright ownership, unlike in Jules Jordan where there
was, unquestionably, no dispute.28
Next, the Second Circuit agreed with the district court that analogizing
Section 204 to the work for hire doctrine did not support precluding the
work for hire doctrine as a third party defense.29 It distinguished Section
204 by stating that it concerns “memorialization of an ownership trans-
fer,” while the work for hire doctrine “guides the determination of own-
ership rights as between employers and employees or independent
contractors.”30 The court noted that “a plaintiff in a copyright infringe-
ment suit bears the burden of proving ownership of the copyright,”
whether against an employer or a third party.31 Finally, the court pointed
to cases that allowed third parties to dispute the validity of an ownership
transfer, even though the third parties had been precluded from challeng-
ing a plaintiff’s ownership rights under the statute of frauds provision of
Section 204.32 The court used these cases to conclude that “third parties
. . . have standing to raise a ‘work for hire’ defense against a claim of
22. M.G.B. Homes, 903 F.2d at 1490.
23. Jules Jordan, 617 F.3d at 1157.
24. Urbont, 831 F.3d at 88.




29. Id. at 87-88; see 17 U.S.C. § 204.
30. Urbont, 831 F.3d at 88.
31. Id. (citing Island Software & Computer. Serv., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 413 F.3d
257, 260 (2d Cir. 2005)).
32. Id. (citing Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 830–31 (3d Cir. 2011)
(holding that third party defendant lacked standing to challenge ownership under Section
204, but that plaintiff “failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the alleged . . . oral
transfer ever occurred”); Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27, 36
(2d Cir. 1982) (superseded by rule, FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)) (precluding defendant’s challenge
to assignment of ownership under statute of frauds, but remanding to district court to de-
termine whether underlying transfer occurred)).
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copyright infringement.”33
The Second Circuit’s analysis is flawed and unpersuasive for three rea-
sons. First, the court failed to analyze the work for hire doctrine within
the underlying purposes of the Copyright Act. Second, the court inappro-
priately distinguished the present case from the Ninth Circuit Jules Jor-
dan case. Finally, the court improperly dismissed the analogy of Section
204 of the Copyright Act, which provides a valid policy justification—
third parties should not be allowed to raise work for hire as a defense to
infringement.
To begin this discussion, it is helpful to review the history of the work
for hire doctrine. Urbont must be analyzed under the now repealed Copy-
right Act of 1909 because the work in question was created in 1966, prior
to the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976.34 Only two types of par-
ties are authorized to sue for copyright infringement: (1) owners of copy-
rights, and (2) owners of exclusive licenses granted by copyright owners.35
The work for hire doctrine was created to help determine which party—
the employer or the employee—owns the copyright to a work created by
an employee.36 The Copyright Act of 1909 “made an employer the ‘au-
thor’ and initial copyright holder of ‘works made for hire.’”37 The statute
contained no further explanation of the works for hire exception, but a
definition of work for hire slowly emerged from case law.38 A ground-
breaking case in the Second Circuit held that the employer is the author
“whenever an employee’s work is produced at the instance and expense
of his employer.”39 The court further stated, “We see no sound reason
why these same principles are not applicable when the parties bear the
relationship of employer and independent contractor.”40 The Second Cir-
cuit thus created a pure “instance and expense” test for works made for
hire:
[The “work for hire”] doctrine is applicable . . . when the employee’s
work is produced at the instance and expense of the employer, or, in
other words, when the “motivating factor in producing the work was
the employer who induced the creation . . . .”41
Simply put, under the work for hire doctrine of the 1909 Copyright
Act, “an ‘employer’ who hires another to create a copyrightable work is
33. Id.
34. See generally Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed by
the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)).
35. Eden Toys, 697 F.2d at 32 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1980)).
36. See Jules Jordan Video, Inc. v. 144942 Canada, Inc., 617 F.3d 1146, 1157 (9th Cir.
2010).
37. Easter Seal Soc’y v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 325 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing 17
U.S.C. § 26 (repealed 1976)).
38. See id.
39. Id. at 326 (quoting Brattleboro Publ’g Co. v. Winmill Publ’g Corp., 369 F.2d 565,
567 (2d Cir. 1966)).
40. Id. (quoting Brattleboro, 369 F.2d at 568).
41. Id. at 327 (quoting Siegel v. Nat’l Periodical Publ’ns, Inc., 508 F.2d 909, 914 (2d
Cir. 1974)).
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the ‘author’ of the work for purposes of the statute, absent an agreement
to the contrary.”42
As can be seen from the judicial history of the work for hire provision,
the provision was created to settle disputes between an employer and an
employee or independent contractor.43 The provision was not created as
a defense for a copyright infringer to use against the two potential owners
of the copyrighted work. If permitted as a third party defense, the work
for hire doctrine gives the alleged infringer, “rather than the creator of
the work, the benefits of finding a work was not a work for hire.”44 This
outcome is incompatible with the overall purpose of the Copyright Act:
to protect the rights of authors.45
The Second Circuit glossed over important aspects of both the present
case and the Jules Jordan case, making its conclusion to allow third party
use of the work for hire defense illogical. The Second Circuit inappropri-
ately focused on the fact that Marvel was not a party to the lawsuit in an
unsuccessful attempt to distinguish the facts of Urbont from the facts of
Jules Jordan.46 Jules Jordan involved defendants that reproduced and dis-
tributed DVDs of copyrighted work created by an employee of the plain-
tiff company.47 The facts demonstrated that “the only two parties with
any possible claim to ownership . . . both believed and intended that” the
employee owned the copyright.48 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that
“it would be unusual and unwarranted to permit a third parties . . . .” to
use the work for hire doctrine to avoid liability when there was no dispute
between the two possible owners of the copyright and both are plaintiffs
to the lawsuit.49
The Second Circuit fixated on the fact that both possible owners of the
copyright were plaintiffs in the lawsuit in Jules Jordan, while the two pos-
sible owners of the copyright of the Iron Man composition were not both
plaintiffs in Urbont.50 It implied that the two possible owners of the copy-
right, Marvel and Urbont, did not agree on who owned the copyright by
arguing that Marvel did not have an opportunity to explain its position.51
The Second Circuit’s argument is illogical because the crucial question is
whether there is a dispute between the two possible owners of the copy-
right, not whether both possible owners to the copyright are plaintiffs in
42. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 554 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing 17
U.S.C. § 26 (repealed 1976)).
43. See Easter Seal Soc’y, 815 F.2d at 325–27; Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v.
Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1489 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
44. M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1490 (11th Cir. 1990);
Easter Seal Soc’y, 815 F.2d at 333.
45. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
46. See Urbont v. Sony Music Entm’t, 831 F.3d 80, 87 (2d Cir. 2016).
47. Jules Jordan Video, Inc. v. 144942 Canada, Inc., 617 F.3d 1146, 1150–51 (9th Cir.
2010).
48. Id. at 1156.
49. Id. at 1157.
50. Id. at 1156; Urbont, 831 F.3d at 87.
51. Urbont, 831 F.3d at 87.
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the lawsuit.52 It can be assumed that no dispute exists between both pos-
sible owners to the copyright if they are both plaintiffs in the lawsuit. This
is especially apparent in Jules Jordan, where the employee in question
was also the sole officer, director, and shareholder of the company.53 But
because that is a rare situation, both possible owners to the copyright
should not be required to be parties to the lawsuit in order for a court to
find that there is no copyright ownership dispute between those parties.
When viewed through this alternative analysis, it is clear that the situa-
tion in Urbont was fundamentally the same as the situation in Jules Jor-
dan. The Jules Jordan court found no dispute between the two possible
owners of the copyright—the Second Circuit should have made a similar
finding in the Urbont case.54 Most significantly, Marvel and Urbont did
not agree in writing that Urbont was the owner of the copyright of the
Iron Man theme song.55 The settlement between the parties referred to
Urbont as the “renewal copyright owner” and to Marvel as the “licen-
see.”56 Additionally, there was no evidence that Marvel had ever asserted
that the Iron Man theme song was a work for hire.57 The facts demon-
strated that Marvel did not dispute Urbont’s ownership of the work and
there was no dispute between the two possible owners of the copyright of
the Iron Man composition.58 Consequently, the Second Circuit’s attempt
to distinguish Urbont from Jules Jordan by focusing on Marvel’s absence
from the lawsuit distorts the Jules Jordan holding and is not a satisfactory
basis for the court’s conclusion that Sony should be permitted to use the
work for hire defense.
Moreover, the Second Circuit unreasonably disregarded the analogy of
Section 204 of the Copyright Act because it provides a valid policy justifi-
cation for the argument that third parties should not be allowed to assert
the work for hire doctrine as a defense to copyright infringement. More
than one circuit court has argued that the work for hire doctrine should
be treated similarly to Section 204.59 Courts have consistently held that
Section 204 cannot be used by a third party to challenge the validity of a
transfer of copyright ownership.60 The Copyright Act of 1976 provides
that “[a] transfer of copyright ownership . . . is not valid unless an instru-
ment of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writ-
52. See Jules Jordan, 617 F.3d at 1156–57.
53. Id. at 1156.
54. Id. at 1157.
55. Urbont, 831 F.3d at 84.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 83; Psihoyos v. Pearson Educ., Inc., 855 F. Supp. 2d 103, 118 (S.D.N.Y.
2012).
58. Urbont, 831 F.3d at 83–84.
59. See Jules Jordan, 617 F.3d at 1157; Billy-Bob Teeth v. Novelty, Inc., 329 F.3d 586,
592–93 (7th Cir. 2003).
60. See Jules Jordan, 617 F.3d at 1157; Billy-Bob Teeth, 329 F.3d at 592-93; Imperial
Residential Design, Inc. v. Palms Dev. Grp., Inc., 70 F.3d 96, 99 (11th Cir. 1995); Eden
Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27, 36 (2d Cir. 1982) (superseded by rule,
FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)).
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ing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed.”61 The purpose of
Section 204 is to resolve disputes between copyright owners and transfer-
ees and, like the Statute of Frauds, to “protect copyright holders from
persons fraudulently claiming oral licenses.”62 When there is no dispute
between the owner and the licensee about the transfer, it would be
“anomalous to permit a third party infringer to invoke this provision
against the licensee.”63 Although the work for hire section is not a Statute
of Frauds section like Section 204, “the reasoning . . . is nonetheless appli-
cable.”64 The work for hire doctrine is designed to establish ownership of
a work between an employer and an employee.65 The doctrine was cre-
ated to protect the copyright owner of work, whether that be the em-
ployer or employee in a given situation, just as Section 204 was created to
protect copyright holders. It would be “unusual and unwarranted” to al-
low third party defendants, such as Sony in the present case, to avoid
liability for infringement by invoking the work for hire doctrine when
there is no apparent dispute between the two potential owners.66 There-
fore, Sony should not have been permitted to raise the work for hire de-
fense as a third-party infringer.67
Due to the existing circuit split, there is a need for clarity in whether
third parties can assert the work for hire defense.68 As a practical matter,
plaintiffs suing for copyright infringement are currently uncertain as to
whether alleged infringers will be permitted to raise a work for hire de-
fense. If all federal appellate courts recognize a third party work for hire
defense, it will change the manner in which plaintiffs assert their claims.
Plaintiffs will essentially be forced to join other potential owners of the
copyright to the suit to ensure that the work for hire defense will not
allow the defendant to escape liability. This will bring more parties to
court, decrease efficiency, and make it more difficult to bring successful
copyright infringement suits. As a theoretical matter, this outcome is an
affront to the purpose of the Copyright Act. The Copyright Act was cre-
ated to protect the rights of copyright owners from infringement. It was
not created to help alleged, and many times admitted, infringers find a
loophole through which they can escape liability for infringement. It
would be a sad conclusion if copyright owners were harmed by the very
Act created to protect them.
61. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2012).
62. Jules Jordan, 617 F.3d at 1157; Billy-Bob Teeth, 329 F.3d at 592; Imperial Residen-
tial Design, 70 F.3d at 99; Eden Toys, 697 F.2d at 36.
63. Eden Toys, 697 F.2d at 36.
64. Jules Jordan, 617 F.3d at 1157. The Jules Jordan court discusses the work for hire
doctrine of the Copyright Act of 1976. However, the basic analogy between the work for
hire doctrine and § 204 is equally applicable to the work for hire doctrine of the Copyright
Act of 1909.
65. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101).
66. Id.
67. See id.
68. See id.; Urbont v. Sony Music Entm’t, 831 F.3d 80, 88 (2d Cir. 2016).
